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APPLE V. PEPPER: RATIONALIZING ANTITRUST’S
INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE
Herbert Hovenkamp*
INTRODUCTION
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme Court held that consumers who
allegedly paid too much for apps sold on Apple’s App Store because of
an antitrust violation could sue Apple for damages because they were “direct purchasers.”1 The decision sidesteps most of the bizarre complexities
that have resulted from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, which held that indirect purchasers could not sue for passedon overcharge injuries under federal antitrust laws.2
I. THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE UNDER ILLINOIS BRICK
The Illinois Brick decision itself was factually straightforward, although its reasoning was controversial. Makers of construction blocks
ﬁxed their prices and sold them to contractors who built buildings for
the State of Illinois.3 No one seriously doubted that when a cartel sells something at a higher price to an intermediary, that intermediary firm will pass
on at least part of the price increase to its own customers, and so on
down the line. The legal question was how the antitrust laws should recognize that fact in determining the right to collect damages.4
Purchaser damages in cartel and monopolization cases are ordinarily
measured by the amount of the price increase, or “overcharge.” Roughly
* James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. This Piece expands and supports a
suggestion made in Herbert Hovenkamp, Fixing Antitrust’s Indirect Purchaser Rule, Reg.
Rev. (July 17, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/17/hovenkamp-fixing-antitrustindirect-purchaser-rule/ [https://perma.cc/7984-LBHN].
1. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977)).
2. 431 U.S. at 746–47. The decision was a logical complement to the Court’s
previous decision in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488 & n.6
(1968), which held that a defendant could not have its damages reduced by the amount
that the plaintiff passed on to its own customers. The Illinois Brick decision and its complex
aftermath are analyzed in 2A Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp, Rodger D. Blair &
Christine Piette Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 346 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter 2A Areeda et
al., Antitrust Law].
3. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
4. Id.
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speaking, this is the difference between the actual price that the
defendant(s) charged and the price that would have prevailed had there
not been any price ﬁxing. As Justice Holmes put it in the ﬁrst Supreme
Court decision to confront the issue, the measure of damages should be
“the difference between the price paid and the market or fair price that
the city would have had to pay under natural conditions had the combination been out of the way, together with an attorney’s fee.”5
Illinois Brick held that the ﬁrst purchaser in line, or the direct
purchaser, should obtain the entire overcharge as damages, without any
reduction for the amount that it had passed on to purchasers beneath it
in the distribution chain.6 Accordingly, indirect purchasers would not be
able to claim any damages, since they had already been recovered in full
by the direct purchaser.7 This rule, the Court noted, was not one of
“standing” but rather of entitlement to damages.8
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court recognized some qualiﬁcations,
indicating that its concern was with the computation of passed-on damages rather than standing to sue.9 For example, purchasers under a preexisting contract that ﬁxed both the quantity and markup could obtain
damages, for in such cases the entire overcharge would be passed on.10
Other exceptions were not mentioned by the Supreme Court but ﬂowed
naturally from the Court’s focus on passed-on damages. For example, the
lower courts have held that Illinois Brick does not preclude an action for
an injunction because no calculation of passed-on damages is necessary.11
In its noneconomic approach based on proximate cause, the Apple

5. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
On the measurement of overcharge damages in cartel cases, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (6th ed. forthcoming
2020) (manuscript § 17.5) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy].
6. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745–46.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 728 n.7. Speciﬁcally, the Court stated:
Because we ﬁnd Hanover Shoe dispositive here, we do not address the
standing issue, except to note, as did the Court of Appeals below, that
the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal
overcharge for purposes of § 4 [of the Clayton Act] is analytically distinct
from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote
to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4.
Id. (citation omitted).
9. See id. at 737.
10. See id. at 736; see also Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 393 U.S. 481,
494 (1968) (recognizing the same exception); 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note
2, ¶ 346e (discussing the exception for preexisting ﬁxed-cost, ﬁxed-quantity contracts).
11. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 402 (3d Cir. 2000);
see also 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 2, ¶ 346d.
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dissenters doubted standing for indirect purchasers seeking only an
injunction.12
The Supreme Court also held in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc. that
the indirect purchaser rule applied even when the direct purchaser passed on 100% of its overcharge.13 The direct purchaser in that case was a
price-regulated utility that operated under a state statute that computed
rates as including a one-to-one pass-through of all variable costs, which
included fuel costs.14 Indeed, as the dissenters pointed out, the state
regulatory provision required complete pass-through of the overcharge,
which appeared as a surcharge on each customer’s utility bill.15 Nevertheless, the Court concluded the utility itself was the direct purchaser and
the customers, who paid the entire overcharge, were merely indirect purchasers.16 In that case, the direct purchasing utility was not injured by the
cartel. By statute, it passed on 100% of its overcharge.17 Further, it suffered little or no decline in output.18 The Supreme Court effectively gave
the only antitrust cause of action to a ﬁrm that had not been injured.
About half of the states have either amended or interpreted their
own antitrust statutes so as to permit indirect purchaser damages actions,
and the Supreme Court has approved such provisions.19 Most of the
litigation progress we have made in determining how antitrust damages
12. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525–27, 1527 n.1 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); see also infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
13. 497 U.S. 199, 203–05 (1990); see also Simon v. KeySpan Corp., 694 F.3d 196, 198
(2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1998 (2013) (mem.) (holding that a retail electric
consumer complaining of price ﬁxing in the wholesale electricity market was an indirect
purchaser).
14. See UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 205. Under cost-of-service ratemaking, a public utility
generally recovers a fair rate of return on its ﬁxed costs plus “pass-through” of variable
costs. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 36–59 (1982); 1 Alfred E. Kahn, The
Economics of Regulation 26–57 (1971).
15. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 222–23 (White, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 207 (majority opinion) (ﬁnding that “the consumers in this case have the
status of indirect purchasers” and therefore “any antitrust claim against the defendants is
not for them, but for the utilities to assert”). The Utilicorp decision rejected a carefully
reasoned opinion by Judge Richard Posner in a related case, who observed not only that
there was perfect 100% pass-through, but also that there was very little output reduction
resulting from the price ﬁx because the retail elasticity of demand for power was very low.
See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 895–97 (7th Cir.
1988); cf. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Atl. Richﬁeld Co., 609 F.2d 497, 499 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that “any functional equivalent of a cost-plus contract exception to the
Hanover Shoe ban against defensive use of passing on must be one that is already in
existence, in that its impact on pricing decisions must be known in advance”).
17. See UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 205.
18. Cf. Hartigan, 852 F.2d at 896 (noting, in an analogous rate regulated
environment, that “an increase in . . . rates was bound to increase the ﬁrm’s revenues”).
19. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989). For a comprehensive
survey of state law indirect purchaser provisions, see 14 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2412d (4th ed. 2019 & Supp. 2019).
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are passed through a distribution chain has undoubtedly occurred in the
context of this state antitrust litigation.
II. COMPLEXITIES AND AMBIGUITIES IN THE DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
The facts of Apple v. Pepper were more complex than those of Illinois
Brick, and illustrate some of the difficulties that the courts have faced in
applying the indirect purchaser rule. The owners of Apple’s iPhones are
required to purchase programs, or “apps,” on Apple’s App Store, which
is itself an app that can be found on the iPhone screen.20 Apple’s App
Store is thus a bottleneck through which the apps’ producers must pass if
they are to reach Apple iPhone users. In this consumer class action,
iPhone owners accused Apple of monopolizing the market for Apple
iPhone app sales, both through this exclusivity requirement and by
charging app producers a very high commission of 30% of the app’s sale
price.21 The plaintiffs alleged the margin was extremely high in relation
to cost because Apple does very little in its role of distributor of these
apps sold by others.22
In this case, unlike Illinois Brick, the customers paid their money and
purchased directly from Apple. “There is no intermediary in the distribution chain between Apple and the consumer.”23 The Supreme Court majority found this to be “dispositive” of the result—namely, that the
plaintiffs paid their money directly to the defendants, and this entitled
them to be treated as direct purchasers.24
This would all seem clear enough were it not for the fact that in the
forty-year history of Illinois Brick jurisprudence other courts had characterized this same problem differently. A case in point is Campos v.
Ticketmaster,25 which was very similar to Apple, although neither the
district court nor either of the Supreme Court opinions in Apple discussed it. The Ninth Circuit decision, however, addressed it at some
length.26 In Ticketmaster, the defendant, Ticketmaster, was an online event
20. Brief for Respondents at 4, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17204), 2018 WL 4659225.
21. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1518–19.
22. See Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 40–41, In re
Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-cv-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2,
2013), 2013 WL 6387366.
23. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521.
24. Id.
25. 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998).
26. For the Ninth Circuit’s discussion, see In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846
F.3d 313, 323 (9th Cir. 2017). For other decisions raising similar issues to Apple, see In re
ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom.
Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 257 (2013) (mem.) (holding that ATM card users
were indirect purchasers, notwithstanding that ATM machine operators, who allegedly
ﬁxed transaction fee prices, charged these to banks, who passed them on 100% to the card
users); McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., 80 F.3d 842, 848–55 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
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ticket retailer accused of monopolizing event ticket sales.27 The purchasers were event goers who bought their tickets directly from Ticketmaster,
paying high processing and handling fees.28 Ticketmaster itself set the
ﬁnal ticket price.29 The court held, however, that the concert promoters
were direct purchasers of “ticket distribution services” from Ticketmaster,30 and that the actual ticket buyers were only indirect purchasers of
these services.31 This was true, the court reasoned, because there was “an
antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, independent purchaser” who was in a position to absorb part or all of the overcharge.32 Under the plaintiff’s theory of the case, the concert promoters
presumedly behaved as most intermediaries behaved: They passed on
Ticketmaster’s high markups by charging higher wholesale prices for the
tickets. The ﬁnal purchasers, who actually used the tickets, were the only
ones unable to pass anything on.
Ticketmaster produces the perverse result that the buyer who is able
to pass on all or part of the overcharge is treated as the direct purchaser
and can sue for damages, while the buyer who is at the end of the line
and must absorb the entire overcharge passed on to it has no damages
claim, even though it purchased directly from the defendant. As in Apple,
the Ticketmaster consumers paid the violator directly, but the Eighth
Circuit found them to be “indirect” purchasers. The Apple decision
effectively overruled Ticketmaster sub silentio. The Apple majority created
an apparently categorical rule that whoever pays the money directly to
the defendant should be counted as the direct purchaser.33
III. THE PROBLEM OF PASSED-ON DAMAGES
Illinois Brick’s indirect purchaser rule was problematic from the
beginning for a number of reasons that the Apple majority did not
address and certainly did not ﬁx. First, it was plainly inconsistent with the
U.S. 825 (1996) (mem.) (holding that lawyers who purchased copies of hospital records
on behalf of clients were the direct purchasers, even though they passed on the entire
price to the clients, who were the plaintiffs); Hyland v. Homeservices of Am., Inc., No.
3:05-cv-612-R, 2006 WL 3498569, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2006) (ﬁnding that Illinois Brick
barred a challenge to real estate broker commission ﬁxing brought by home buyers);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 44, app. A at 5a–6a, Durkin v. Major League Baseball, 519
U.S. 825 (1996) (No. 95-208) (including the Third Circuit opinion, which held that cable
television subscribers were indirect purchasers with respect to their claim of price-ﬁxing
among sports teams, cable channels, and cable programmers when these prices were
charged to local cable television companies and then passed on to subscribers).
27. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d at 1168.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1169, 1171–72.
30. Id. at 1171.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1169.
33. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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antitrust damages statute, which gives an action to “any person who shall
be injured in his business or property” by an antitrust violation.34 That
hardly sounds like a limitation to direct purchasers.
A.

Computing Pass-on

Second, the Illinois Brick Court exaggerated the difficulty of
“tracing” indirect purchaser damages. Computing how damages are
passed on at each stage of a distribution chain requires “incidence” analysis, which economists use to compute how a tax or other expenditure is
passed along through the economy. In general, the more elastic a ﬁrm’s
demand, the more of an overcharge it will shift to others. By contrast, the
more inelastic its demand the more it will have to absorb.35 Indeed, the
earliest explicit Supreme Court applications of economic analysis to a
legal problem occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, and involved computation of how a tax might be passed on from one entity to another.36 While
the Illinois Brick decision acknowledged its relevance,37 later decisions
held that the effect of Illinois Brick was to forbid the use of incidence analysis in the estimation of passed-on antitrust damages.38
34. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) reads:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .
35. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois
Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602, 615–21 (1979). For a critique, see Robert Cooter, Passing on
the Monopoly Overcharge: A Further Comment on Economic Theory, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1523 (1981).
36. E.g., Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 581–82 & n.1 (1931)
(Stone, J., dissenting) (applying economic analysis to the incidence of a sales tax). The
economist who contributed nearly all of the citations in these cases was Edwin R.A.
Seligman. See generally Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation
(5th ed., rev. ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1926) (1899); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Taxation
of Corporations. III., 5 Pol. Sci. Q. 636, 671–75 (1890); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The General
Property Tax, 5 Pol. Sci. Q. 24 (1890); Edwin R.A. Seligman, On the Shifting and
Incidence of Taxation, 7 Publications Am. Econ. Ass’n 7, 119 (1892). On the use of early
marginalist economics to deal with problems of tax incidence, as well as the courts’
numerous citations to Seligman, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law:
Neoclassical Legal Thought, 1870–1970, at 106–22, 367 n.59 (2015) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law].
37. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741 n.25 (1977).
38. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that Illinois Brick bars the use of incidence analysis in the
computation of passed-on damages); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163
n.19, 1166 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting the Illinois Brick Court’s disapproval of the “speculative
nature” of incidence analysis); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Commentary, The IndirectPurchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1717, 1721 (1990) (“[T]he Illinois
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To illustrate the problem, if a farmer is taxed on wheat, she may
absorb part of that tax but pass a portion on to the wholesale bread
baker, who may in turn pass some of it on to the grocer, who will then
pass part of it on to the consumer. The technical quantiﬁcation of passon is quite demanding, requiring determination of the elasticities of
supply and demand facing each individual ﬁrm in the distribution
chain.39 A further complication is that the calculations are very sensitive
to the distribution of ﬁxed and variable costs. Variable costs generally
show up in the market price and are passed on; ﬁxed costs generally are
not.40
However, in most cases antitrust experts can assess damages without
computing pass-on.41 For example, under the “before-and-after” method,
the expert looks at a market just prior to the violation, just subsequent,
or both, comparing prices during the violation and nonviolation periods.42 The “yardstick” method of estimating damages compares prices in
the violation market with those in a similar “yardstick” market where the
violation is thought not to be occurring.43 In both cases, one does not
need to estimate pass-on at each stage. Rather, the expert compares the
price in the cartel market with the price in some reasonably similar comparator market that was not affected by the cartel.44
For example, suppose that dairies are ﬁxing prices, raising the
wholesale price of milk from $2.00 to $3.00 per gallon. The milk is sold
to distributors, who sell it to grocers, who ﬁnally sell it to consumers.
Computing the amount passed on by each of these would be difficult.
But suppose we can identify a “yardstick” market, similar to the cartel
market but without price ﬁxing. In that market the dairies’ wholesale
price is $2.00, as it should be. Ignoring the distributors and grocers, who
are not parties, we also observe that retail prices in this competitive market are $2.90, while retail prices in the cartel market are $3.75. If consumers sue, we do not need to know how much of the overcharge was passed
on at each level. These numbers tell us that although not all of the overcharge was passed on, consumers in the cartel market paid 85 cents more

Brick exception for pre-existing, ﬁxed-markup, ﬁxed-quantity contracts should be
broadened to cover all ‘cost-plus’ contracts.”); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Incidence Analysis
and the Supreme Court: Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ.
Rev. 69, 72–84 (1982) (explaining the basic principles of incidence analysis).
39. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 620.
40. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 35, at 1523–24.
41. See 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 2, ¶ 346k.
42. See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, supra note 5, § 17.5b2.
43. Id. § 17.5b1. Illustrating the methodology is Greenhaw v. Lubbock Cty. Beverage
Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 1983). In Greenhaw, the court stated, “By comparing
these ‘should have been’ prices to the actual prices charged in 1975, [the expert] was able
to estimate the amount of overcharge resulting from defendants’ price-ﬁxing activity.” Id.
44. See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, supra note 5, § 17.5.
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for their milk. This represents their overcharge, regardless of how much
was absorbed at each link along the way.45
Courts have approved these incidence-avoiding methodologies in
cases involving state antitrust laws that permit indirect purchaser recoveries.46 As one court observed, “the before-and-after ‘yardstick’
methodology has been accepted by courts as a means to measuring
damages in both indirect and direct purchaser antitrust actions.”47 One
district court noted and approved the plaintiff expert’s use in what it
characterized as:
[A] “bottom across” approach which obviates the complexities
Defendants cite in their “top down” approach. “Bottom across”
means that the overcharge is determined by examining the
price differential between the generic and the brand drug at
the retail level only. Thus, there will be no need to review “passthrough” variations.48

45. Id. § 17.5b1. For a situation where computation of pass-on was not required, see
Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 93-CV-5148 (ILG), 2002 WL
31528625, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002). The plaintiff pharmacies were indirect
purchasers of pharmaceuticals complaining under state antitrust law that a charge-back
system effectively required them to pay more for pharmaceuticals than did favored
purchasers, such as HMOs. The plaintiffs’ claimed injury was mainly loss in their ability to
compete with the favored purchasers. Id. at *1–3. In this case, overcharge damages could
be computed by comparing the net price paid by the pharmacies with that paid by other
purchasers at the same distribution level; in any event, diversion of sales rather than the
overcharge better captures the plaintiffs’ injuries.
46. E.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 207, 232–33 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(approving the methodology); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D.
672, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (same); see also In re Class 8 Transmission Indirect Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 339, 349–54 (D. Del. 2015) (evaluating incidence-avoiding
methodologies, but ﬁnding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden), vacated on other
grounds, 679 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2017); cf. Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-99-709,
CV-99-752, 2001 WL 1012261, at *16 (Me. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2001) (expressing doubt
about the methodology when the defendant sold at a wide variety of prices).
47. In re Flonase, 284 F.R.D. at 232. For an expression of skepticism, see Thomas A.
Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s Business Model, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 187 (2006) (reviewing
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (2005)) (arguing
that the indirect purchaser rule “provides a closer to optimal level of deterrence” than
incidence-avoiding methodologies).
48. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 326, 344 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see
also In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-12730-DJC, 2017 WL 53695, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 4,
2017) (observing but not passing judgment on the plaintiff’s proposed methodology for
estimating passed-on damages). The In re Asacol court stated:
According to the EPPs [“End Payor Plaintiffs,” or the last purchasers in
line], they are not calculating “injury or damages by relying on a topdown vertical ‘pass-through’ economic analysis[.]” Rather, “EPPs will use
a ‘yardstick’ damages and impact methodology to examine the retail
price of the drugs EPPs were forced to purchase” in comparison “to the
forecasted price (and volume) of the drug that should have been available
but-for Defendants’ misconduct[.]”[].
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Who Is Injured, and How?

Third, if we were going to give the overcharge to a single set of
buyers it should be the end users, not the direct purchasers. The end
user is the only person in the distribution chain who is unable to pass
anything on.49 The impact varies from one situation to another, but in
many cases the largest losses are those absorbed by end users, and often
they absorb the entire overcharge. Many intermediaries use markup formulas that are standardized across products. Consider the dairy example.
Suppose that the milk retailer is Kroger, which routinely computes a 10%
markup on its dairy products, depending on the extent of competition
each item faces. If it pays $2.50 at wholesale in a competitive market it
adds 10%, or 25¢. However, if it pays $3.50 it also adds 10%, which is now
35¢. Far from “absorbing” part of the overcharge, Kroger actually exacts
a higher markup when the price of milk is ﬁxed, reﬂecting its standardized percentage of the higher cartel price. The consumer gets hit even
harder. However, the Supreme Court has applied the indirect purchaser
rule even to situations, such as price regulated industries, where it is clear
that pass-through is 100%.50
This is not to say that Kroger in the above example is not injured by
the price ﬁxing. Its injury results from lost volume rather than the overcharge. Under collusion, sales volume goes down.51 This suggests an
important principle: The real injury to direct purchasers and other
intermediaries in the distribution chain is not from the overcharge at all;
rather, it is from the loss of sales volume. As a result, the “overcharge” is
not even the theoretically correct measure of damages for an intermediary who passes on at least part of an overcharge.
If we really wanted to award damages based on injury to a buyer’s
business or property, as the statute requires, we would compute damages
as lost proﬁts for all intermediaries, including the direct purchaser. Only
the ﬁnal purchaser, or consumer, should obtain damages for the amount
of the overcharge passed on to it. Lost proﬁt damages do not present
problems of computing pass-on. Rather, they require information about
the impact of the unlawful practice on both the volume of sales and the
reseller’s margin. In response to a cartel, volume virtually always goes
down. Margins can go down, up, or stay the same depending on the
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). On the use of “comparator” methods
rather than estimating passed-on damages, see Ewa Mendys-Komphorst, Assessing
Damages in Antitrust Actions, Global Arbitration Rev. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://
globalarbitrationreview.com/print_article/gar/chapter/1177446/assessing-damages-inantitrust-actions?print=true [https://perma.cc/284J-JNQ7].
49. See 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 2, ¶¶ 346a–c, k.
50. E.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990); see supra text
accompanying notes 13–18.
51. See Peter Asch & J. J. Seneca, Is Collusion Proﬁtable?, 58 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 1, 4–5
(1976) (ﬁnding that the presence of collusive behavior is negatively associated with ﬁrm
proﬁtability, on which the demand for the ﬁrm’s products exerts an important effect).

2019]

INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE

23

reseller’s markup practices or the intensity of competition that it faces.52
The before-and-after and “yardstick” methodologies commonly used in
cases involving business damages work here as well.53
To be sure, in common with all commercial damages formulas, lost
proﬁt formulations impose some complexities, but these are not different in substance from those experienced by the victims of antitrust violations that exclude rivals, where overcharge measures are not relevant.54
Indeed, a wide variety of commercial legal violations that are subject to
private enforcement compute damages as lost proﬁts.55
Computing the lost proﬁts that result from a cartel’s higher prices
need not be any more complex than computing the lost proﬁts resulting
from, say, patent infringement or the breach of a supply contract. For
example, the Patent Act permits recovery of lost proﬁts attributable to an
infringement,56 which requires the fact ﬁnder to determine the harm
caused by each infringing sale of something that could range from a full
substitute for the plaintiff’s product57 to a relatively small component.58 If
the patent is for an improvement, the fact ﬁnder must disaggregate that
portion of the loss of sales attributable to the improvement from that

52. See Jorge Padilla, Economist’s Note: Should Proﬁt Margins Play a More Decisive
Role in Horizontal Merger Control?, 9 J. Eur. Competition L. & Prac. 260, 261–62
(describing the relationship between proﬁt margins and competition).
53. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1946) (using
the two damage methods in conjunction); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667
(5th Cir. 1974) (explaining methods of proving lost proﬁts).
54. On lost proﬁt damages for exclusionary practices, see 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust
Law, supra note 2, ¶ 397.
55. E.g., Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019)
(approving a lost-proﬁt measure in a breach of trademark case); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same in a patent infringement case); Biotronik A.G. v.
Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 11 N.E.3d 676 (N.Y. 2014) (same in a breach of contract
case); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41
(Tex. 1998) (same in a tort and breach of contract case).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
57. See, e.g., WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2135, 2139
(2018) (applying a patent damages provision to foreign sales of an infringer’s product that
was substantially identical to patentee’s product).
58. See, for example, Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, concluding that the infringement damages should equal:
[T]he difference between his pecuniary condition after the
infringement, and what his condition would have been if the
infringement had not occurred, is to be measured, so far as his own sales
of locks are concerned, by the difference between the money he would
have realized from such sales if the infringement had not interfered with
such monopoly, and the money he did realize from such sales. If such
difference can be ascertained by proper and satisfactory evidence, it is a
proper measure of damages.
117 U.S. 536, 552–53 (1886).
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portion attributable to noninfringing conduct.59 There is no reason for
thinking that computation of lost-proﬁt damages from collusion would
be more difficult than this.
While pass-on must be allocated individually for each successive link
in the distribution chain, loss of output is often simpler because the same
loss passes from one entity to the next. For example, if a cartel of wheat
growers reduces output by 30%, wholesale bakers will bake 30% less
bread and retailers will sell 30% fewer loaves. Of course, complexities in
the distribution chain, including the ability of intermediaries to vary the
proportions of their inputs, can complicate these numbers.
Guidelines from the European Commission to the national courts of
member states permit purchaser damages to be computed by all of the
methodologies discussed here.60 Injuries for what the Guidelines describe
as “price effects,” or overcharge, can be estimated using the conventional
pass-on methodologies contemplated in the Illinois Brick decision, or else
by comparing overcharges in the violation market with those in markets
that are not affected.61 The Guidelines also permit damages to be based

59. As the Court in Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884), stated:
When a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely new
machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what particulars his
improvement has added to the usefulness of the machine or
contrivance. He must separate its results distinctly from those of the
other parts, so that the beneﬁts derived from it may be distinctly seen
and appreciated.
Id. at 121.
60. Guidelines for National Courts on How to Estimate the Share of Overcharge
Which Was Passed on to the Indirect Purchaser, 2019 O.J. (C 267) 4, 24 [hereinafter
Guidelines for National Courts] (“When estimating the passing-on related price effect
national courts may rely on different types of economic approaches to
quantiﬁcation . . . .”).
61. Id. at 24–25. The Guidelines describe these as “comparator-based” methods,
giving as examples:
[1] price or margin data concerning this market before and/or after the
infringement, usually referred to as the before-during-after approach;
[2] data concerning the same (product) market but in a different
geographical area, or another product market that is considered to
evolve in a similar manner to the market where the direct or indirect
purchaser operates, usually referred to as the cross-sectional approach;
or
[3] a combination of comparisons over time and comparisons across
markets, usually referred to as the difference-in-differences approach.
Id. at 25; see also Miguel de la Mano & Christopher Milde, Estimating the Pass-on Effect in
Antitrust Damage Cases: Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Comparator” Method
vs. the “Pass-on Rate” Method (Apr. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3380657 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). For a more comprehensive look at the problem in a wide variety of European actions, not limited to
competition law, see generally Magnus Strand, The Passing-on Problem in Damages and
Restitution Under EU Law (2017).
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on what they call the “volume effect,” or lost proﬁts from loss of sales.62
Just like § 4 of the Clayton Act, the EU Damages Directive authorizes
national courts to award provable damages for injuries sustained, but
does not specify a particular methodology.63 However, the EU takes the
more realistic approach, and one that is more faithful to the relevant
provisions, of permitting damages to be estimated by any controllable
method for which there is adequate evidentiary support.
C.

Addressing Indirect Purchaser Harm: Expert Testimony

The Illinois Brick decision is apparently based on the premise that
damages measurement in antitrust cases is exceptional and requires
special and more categorical treatment than is used for other types of
commercial injuries. That is hardly obvious. One possible distinction is
the existence of treble damages, but Congress can always change that. As
noted above, other types of injuries such as those that result from patent
infringement pose complexities that are as great or greater.64
Rather than being so categorical about the nature of damages, we
should assess how damages operate in a particular case, and the variations can be substantial. This means that judges must assess the reliability
and applicability of expert testimony. Once a judge has made that assessment and admitted the testimony, the testimony still must be subjected to
rigorous cross-examination at trial.
The Supreme Court’s Daubert decision,65 which came ﬁfteen years
after Illinois Brick, should be the controlling mechanism for evaluating
expert models rather than anything as blunt, categorical, and frankly
wrong as the indirect purchaser rule.66 Daubert rulings, which are generally not subject to jury control, should provide judges with an adequate
mechanism for ensuring that expert damages reports are based on reliable and relevant assumptions, methodologies, and data.67 In a particular
62. Guidelines for National Courts, supra note 60, at 13.
63. Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
November 2014 on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for
Infringement of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the
European Union, 2014 O.J. (L 349) 1, 8–9 (stating that each member state has the
responsibility to determine its own rules for qualifying the harm, such as the required
proof and methods).
64. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
66. On the use of Daubert in antitrust damages models see 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust
Law, supra note 2, ¶¶ 340a, 399.
67. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 39 (2013) (Ginsburg & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) (assuming that Daubert applies to expert evidence in antitrust case); ZF
Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying Daubert to
damages evidence of lost proﬁts in an antitrust case); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros
Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563–67 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Daubert to evidence of an
overcharge from collusion).
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case, if there is doubt about a particular expert opinion, the court will be required to make a Daubert ruling with respect to the expert’s methodology.68
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE, OR THE PROPER MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES?
The Apple dissenters adopted a distinctively noneconomic approach
that dispensed with the pass-on problem entirely. Indeed, they were not
even concerned about who was injured. They reasoned that only the
direct purchaser had an injury that was “proximately caused” by the
defendant’s antitrust violation.69 This view harkens back to a nineteenthcentury tort law concept that was used by some courts to limit tort
liability, particularly in railroad cases.70 Under this rule, only a single
entity could be said to have an injury that was proximately caused by the
defendant’s conduct. That approach was rejected by John Stuart Mill by
the mid-nineteenth century.71 The dissent’s approach also detaches
proximate cause concerns from the factor that has always been central to
proximate cause inquiries—foreseeability.72 Indeed, it is so foreseeable
that overcharge injuries will be passed on that no one seriously disputes
it.73
In the legal system, this narrow approach to proximate cause analysis
was properly abandoned in tort cases and should be laid to rest. In economics, it was very largely upended by the marginalist revolution, which

68. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811–13 (7th
Cir. 2012).
69. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1530–31 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Blythe v. Denver & R.G. Ry. Co., 25 P. 702, 702–04 (Colo. 1891) (holding
that an “act of God” did not meet the requirement of proximate cause); Stone v. Bos. &
A.R. Co., 51 N.E. 1, 2–4 (Mass. 1898) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover when oil
leaking from barrels on a railroad platform was ignited by a person unconnected to the
railroad for a lack of proximate cause); see also Hovenkamp, The Opening of American
Law, supra note 36, 106–22.
71. See 1 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a
Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and Methods of Scientiﬁc Investigation
241, 398 (1843) (“For every event, there exists some combination of objects or events,
some given concurrence of circumstances, positive and negative, the occurrence of which
will always be followed by that phenomenon.”). A sharp debate ensued in the United
States between Mill and Francis Wharton, an orthodox cleric who wrote on legal subjects
and adhered to strictly premarginalist views. See Francis Wharton, The Liability of Railway
Companies for Remote Fires: Proximate and Remote Cause 731–47 (1876); Francis
Wharton, A Suggestion as to Causation 5–14 (1874).
72. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 95 (1881) (“There is no
such power [to avoid evil] where the evil cannot be foreseen.”); see also Mark F. Grady,
Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 293, 322–33 (2002); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1247, 1252–
54 (2009).
73. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305–06 (2017) (ﬁnding
that proximate cause limited liability for a Fair Housing Act violation, even for certain
foreseeable harms).
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ﬁrst provided serious tools to investigate how economic disruptions are
passed through the economy.74 It makes even less sense in antitrust cases.
The Apple dissent’s view also confuses questions about proximate
cause, or legal cause, with questions about the proper way to measure
damages.75 Illinois Brick was distinctly not a case about causation or proximate cause. Indeed, the majority never used the term at all, and Justice
Brennan used it only a single time in his dissent.76 The virtually exclusive
concern with Illinois Brick was with computation of damages in situations
where an overcharge might be passed on from one party to another.
Even on its own terms it seems hard to justify a conclusion that only
the direct purchaser has an injury “proximately caused” by the violation
when in many cases it suffered no overcharge injury at all.
CONCLUSION
Working within the context of the existing Illinois Brick rule, the
majority reached the right conclusion about its application in Apple v.
Pepper. While that eliminates some of the irrationalities of the indirect
purchaser rule as it has been applied, it is hardly a solution to the
problem. The correct solution is more consistent with the statutory language granting an action to (1) “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property,” and then measuring the recovery as the (2)
“damages by him sustained.”77 In the process, this solution addresses a
serious and widely recognized problem—namely, that the current policy
toward price ﬁxing under-deters.78
74. See Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law, supra note 36, 123–55.
75. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1528–31 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
76. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
78. See, e.g., OECD, Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals 17 (2003),
https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/34306028.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GA9DYWM9] (“It is commonly assumed, however, that corporate ﬁnes rarely reach a level that
would maximize their deterrent effect.”); Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price
Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 531, 535 (1991) (ﬁnding
that the probability of a particular conspiracy being caught is between 13% to 17% in a
given year); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy:
Crime Pays, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 427, 435–42 (2012) (describing the debate generally
between optimal “law and economics” deterrence approaches targeting corporations and
individual sanctions); John M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic
Evidence, 22 Res. L. & Econ. 59, 107 (2007) (“Despite the evident increases in cartel
detection rates and the size of monetary ﬁnes and penalties in the past decade, a good
case can be made that current global anticartel regimes are under-deterring.”); Joseph E.
Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei, What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us About
the Duration of All Cartels?, 127 Econ. J. 1977, 1977–79, 2003 (2017) (describing generally
the theoretical issues with estimating the duration of cartels from observed behavior of
discovered cartels and effects on claims about deterrence); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Approach to Price Fixing, 77 Antitrust L.J. 343, 446 (2011) (“Because of difficulties with
detection, achieving effective deterrence is not easy, and empirical evidence suggests that
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End-user purchasers who are not in a position to pass on anything
should be awarded overcharge damages for the full overcharge they paid,
for that measures the injury that they have sustained. All intermediaries
beginning with the direct purchaser should be awarded damages for lost
proﬁts, which represents injuries from both absorbed overcharges and
the loss of sales that always accompany collusion. None of these recoveries is “duplicative,” and none requires complex apportioning of passed
on damages. More importantly, this methodology is driven by the facts of
each case and brings antitrust damages measurement more in line with
damages formulation across the full range of commercial harms.

deterrence is inadequate even in the United States, which is regarded to have the toughest
enforcement in terms of both overall (public and private) effort and the level of
sanctions.”); Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 5 Eur. Comp. J. 19, 29–33, 36 (2009) (arguing that deterrence requires individual
sanctions, and more than monetary sanctions); see also Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy, supra note 5, §§ 4.1–.7, 17.1–.7.

